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Abstract 
In this paper, I develop a hybrid model that contains elements of both agent based simulations 
(ABS) as well as analytic Cournot models, to study the effects of firm characteristics, market 
characteristics, and innovation on market concentration, as measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI).  The model accommodates the following components: multiple firms with 
heterogeneous marginal costs, market entry and exit, barriers to entry, low or high cost 
industries, changing demand, varying levels of marginal cost reducing returns-to-innovation, 
varying costs associated with innovation, increased returns to innovation from past experience 
innovating, and varying propensities to innovate within the market.  The components mentioned 
above are commonly cited as determinants of market concentration.  A sensitivity analysis which 
is robust to high degrees of model complexity demonstrates that the model provides results that 
are consistent with economic theories of markets.   
 
 
Key words. Agent-based simulation, Cournot, Heterogeneous agents, Repeated games, 
Sensitivity analysis. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In this paper, I develop a hybrid model that contains elements of both agent based simulations 
(ABS) as well as analytic Cournot models, to study the effects of firm characteristics, market 
characteristics, and innovation on market concentration, as measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI).  One contribution of this paper is that it demonstrates that ABS and analytic models 
are not necessarily competing approaches to modeling; rather, they can be complementary.  
Cournot models are game theory models involving firms who make strategic output decisions 
that take into consideration the output choices of competing firms in the market.  These game 
theory models are especially useful since most real world markets can be characterized as 
imperfectly competitive, where the actions of one firm affect the profitability and actions of 
other firms.  The Cournot model is one of the primary models of imperfect competition usually 
studied in the context of oligopoly.  Game theory provides a tool by which such 
interdependencies can be examined and in a dynamic setting where games are repeated 
computational methods such as ABS are often employed in the analysis. 
The model developed in this paper is a flexible n-firm Cournot model that when n=1 produces 
monopoly price and quantity and as n→∞ produces the perfectly competitive market price and 
quantity.  The model accommodates the following components: multiple firms with 
heterogeneous marginal costs, market entry and exit, barriers to entry, low or high cost 
industries, changing demand, varying levels of marginal cost reducing returns-to-innovation, 
varying costs associated with innovation, increased returns to innovation from past experience 
innovating, and varying propensities to innovate within the market.  The components mentioned 
above are commonly cited as determinants of market concentration.   
 To study the effects that each model parameter has on market concentration a sensitivity 
analysis similar to that developed by Brenner [1] is employed.  While the analysis is similar to 
Brenner’s novel approach to model verification, I do provide a full presentation of the regression 
analysis which provides more clarity on the approach and allows a discussion of heterogeneity as 
a measure of uncertainty at various parameter settings, a topic which is not present in the 
Brenner article.  The sensitivity analysis method is robust for understanding and untangling the 
various layers of complexity inherent in agent based simulations containing many parameters.   
The parameters are divided into two groups.  The first includes firm and market 
characteristics with a theoretical background well established in the neo-classical framework of 
economics.  The results from the sensitivity analysis for this group are consistent with economic 
theory and statistically significant.  The second group of parameters relates specifically to the 
innovation aspect of the simulation and the associated economic theories are in many cases 
contradictory.  The results for this group are discussed in terms of Schumpeterian theory, 
endogeneity theory, and evolutionary theories proposed by simulation researchers.  
 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
ABS models, although scant in the literature, are especially important to those studying how 
industries organize themselves [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. Brenner [1], for example, shows the 
benefits of simulation in understanding generative aspects of mechanisms associated with the 
evolution of industrial clusters.  With an ABS approach the researcher gains both a dynamic 
modeling tool and a high degree of heterogeneity not found in static models or dynamic models 
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that are based on systems of ordinary differential equations.  In reality, industries have both a 
high degree of heterogeneity in terms of cost structure and develop through complex dynamic 
processes. 
Two primary concerns of early work in simulation models has been 1) to establish that the 
models are consistent with their analytic counterparts and 2) that the dynamic processes by 
which an equilibrium is or isn’t attained serves as a rich source of information regarding the 
individual agent’s behavior and motivations.  Price [7], for example, compares evolutionary 
programming to several classic analytic models to demonstrate that analytic model results can be 
achieved via simulation.  Additionally he demonstrates that the method provides unique 
information by allowing learning-agents to modify their behaviors and evolve strategies as they 
interact within the model. 
Within this area of ABS there are three key phenomena of interest in a dynamic setting that 
have been explored in the previous literature.  The research might focus on one component alone 
or some combination of components.  The first is process innovation which reduces costs, affects 
the innovating firms profitability, the distribution of market share, and hence the concentration of 
the market.  Second is product innovation, advertising, and external shocks that affect consumer 
demand which may be volatile and may be increasing or decreasing over time.  This can either 
force firms out of a market or bring more firms in which ultimately affects market concentration.  
Third, firms can adapt to their environment and learn from experience.  Essentially, in terms of 
learning, firms may either react to some measure of their own performance such as profitability, 
may react to the behavior of competitors, or may react to changes in the environment such as 
changing demand.  This too affects the way and rate at which market concentration changes.   
Barr and Saraceno [8] examine learning in a Cournot duopoly setting.  Their study focuses on 
how firms learn to react to environmental changes (changing demand) in determining optimal 
output.  They characterize firms as artificial neural networks that make output decisions based on 
environmental factors.  As the environment changes firms change their behavior and converge 
toward an optimal behavior.  Firms learn which behavior reaps the greatest reward given the 
environment.  Bischi and Kopel [9] explore a similar scenario of agent learning based on 
adaptive expectations.  Kimbrough, Lu, and Murphy [10] and Kimbrough and Murphy [11] 
develop models of agent learning in repeated Cournot games that allow the development of 
collusion.  Finally, Thomas Riechmann [12] studies agent learning in oligopoly games and the 
effect that learning has on producing Cournot or Walrasian outcomes.  He distinguishes 
individual learning from social learning and explores parameters for agent rationality.  In models 
of individual learning agents interact in the market but update their strategies independent of 
other firms.  The social learning models are characterized by firms learning from one another 
after interacting in the market.  
Learning in agent based computational economic models, whether in a Cournot setting or not, 
often involves innovation.  In this sense, firms might learn to innovate thru research and 
development, learn to imitate competitors, or learn about how to improve their own processes by 
doing what it is they do (learning-by-doing).  Kerber and Saam [13] model a Hayekian learning 
mechanism based on experimentation where firms imitate rivals’ technologies creating a 
knowledge generating market process.  Pajares, Lopez-Paredes, and Hernandez-Iglesias [3] use 
an ABS approach to model market evolution when firms are allowed to invest in either process 
innovation (learning-by-doing) or product innovation which allows them to create a new product 
and enter a new market and/or to exit a market they are already in. 
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 Other research that has to do with firms innovating over time include studies such as Athey 
and Schmutzler [4] which looks at how market dominance emerges under various types of 
continuous investment schemes such as incremental investment, patent races, learning-by-doing, 
and network externalities.  As firms self-invest or innovate they reduce costs and as a result gain 
market share and increased profits.  Similarly Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers [5] examine 
market structure under innovation where one firm is an innovation leader and other firms imitate.  
Based on their results they make suggestions for anti-trust policy and patent policy.  One of the 
first papers in this vein of research was Vickers [6] which looked at the effects of innovation on 
market share in a Cournot duopoly game.  He finds that highly competitive product market 
behavior leads to market dominance from innovation but that Cournot behavior leads to action-
reaction on the part of the firms resulting in diminished gains in market share.  
In addition to learning in innovation studies, ABS based Cournot game research focuses on 
firm reactions to a changing environment as is the case in oligopoly pricing under changing 
demand conditions.  Wilson and Reynolds [14] in their empirical piece find that during demand 
expansion price is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but that in a recession firms set prices above 
the competitive price.  Genc, Reynolds, and Sen [15] find that in markets with volatile demand it 
is possible for oligopoly firms to increase profits.  Finally, Sznajd-Weron and Weron [16] use an 
agent based model to look at how advertising affects demand and performance in a duopoly 
market.   
The model developed in this paper accommodates marginal cost reducing innovations and 
demand shocks.  In its present form the model does not contain a learning component in the 
terms discussed above though does allow firms to gain experience from previous innovations 
which increases the returns to future innovations.  After developing the model in the next section 
several hypotheses will be tested to determine if the simulation provides results for the first 
group of parameters that are consistent with mainstream market theory.  Namely:  
  
 Markets with high costs of production tend to be more concentrated than markets with low 
costs of production.   
 As demand expands all firms become more profitable and more firms enter the market which 
decreases market concentration. 
 As barriers to entry increase the number of firms entering a market decreases and the market 
becomes more concentrated. 
 
For the second group of parameter, which is specific to the innovation aspect of the model, the 
results from the sensitivity analysis will be discussed in the context of, and compared to, several 
contradictory theories relating innovation to market structure.  These include: Schumpeterian 
theory, which hypothesizes large firms in concentrated industries drive innovation, endogeneity 
theory, which hypothesizes that both market concentration and innovation are endogenous and 
determined by external factors such as technology, demand, institutional arrangement, strategic 
behavior, and chance, and finally evolutionary theories which developed out of the work of 
simulation researchers.  Although no formal hypotheses are tested here the parameters are 
explored to determine their effect, statistical significance, and relation to the above mentioned 
theories.  The parameter effects examined include:        
 
 Changing costs for innovation for all firms in a market. 
 Changing the cost reductions experienced from innovations for all firms in a market. 
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 Changing the propensity for firms to innovate in a market. 
 
 
3 Model 
 
As mentioned above, the model developed here combines aspects of an analytic Cournot model 
and an ABS model.  Given the complexity of the ABS systems described above, namely 
heterogeneous agents (i.e. differing marginal costs), multiple agents, and multiple parameters of 
interest it would be very difficult if not impossible to solve the time paths as discussed above in 
true Cournot fashion.  This demonstrates one of the key limitations of traditional analytic models 
especially in a dynamic setting.  That said, Sarkar, Gupta, and Pal [17] have developed an 
analytic heterogeneous multi-firm model that relies on a marginal cost averaging method for 
computing the Cournot solution, and so from a purist perspective is not technically a Cournot 
solution, but is a close approximation.  This averaging method also allows some non-linear 
analyses that are not available in the true Cournot solution though they are not explored here.  
The ABS model developed for this paper relies on this same marginal cost averaging process. 
 
3.1 The n-Firm Cournot Element of the Model   
 
To derive the n-firm Cournot solution Sarkar, Gupta, and Pal begin with inverse demand 
𝑃 𝑄 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄, where a>0 and b>0.  Each firm chooses 𝑞𝑖  to maximize profit, 𝜋𝑖 =
𝑞𝑖 𝑃 𝑄 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖 .  In words, profit equals total revenue minus total cost where 𝑚𝑐𝑖  is each firm’s 
marginal cost.  Firm 𝑖′𝑠 first order condition for profit maximization is 
 
𝑃 𝑄 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖 − 𝑏𝑞𝑖 = 0.                (1)   
 
Summing first order conditions for all firms gives 𝑁𝑃 𝑄 − 𝑏𝑄 =  𝑚𝑐𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 .  Dividing this by 
N produces 𝑃 𝑄 −
𝑏𝑄
𝑁
= 𝑚𝑐    . Where 𝑚𝑐    = ( 𝑚𝑐𝑖)/𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1 , the average marginal cost in the 
market.  Substituting 𝑃 𝑄 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄 into the previous equation produces  
 
𝑎 −  
𝑁+1
𝑁
 𝑏𝑄 = 𝑚𝑐    .                 (2) 
 
In equilibrium 𝑄∗, market equilibrium can be found by setting 𝑚𝑐     equal to the linear function 
with the same intercept as demand but with a slope of −  
𝑁+1
𝑁
 𝑏.  So,  
𝑄∗ =
 𝑎−𝑚𝑐      
𝑏
(
𝑁
𝑁+1
).  From here 𝑃∗ = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄∗.  Substituting 𝑄∗ yields  
𝑃∗ = 𝑎 − 𝑏[
 𝑎−𝑚𝑐      
𝑏
 
𝑁
𝑁+1
 ] which reduces to 𝑃∗ = 𝑎 − (𝑎 − 𝑚𝑐    )  
𝑁
𝑁+1
 .  When N=1 the 
monopoly 𝑄∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃∗ are produced and as N increases the perfect competition 𝑄∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃∗ are 
produced.  Equation (1) above implies that for each individual firm 𝑞𝑖
∗ =  𝑃∗ − 𝑚𝑐𝑖 /𝑏.  
Plugging 𝑃∗ into 𝑞𝑖
∗ yields the reaction function for the individual firm where each firm’s output 
is dependent on its own marginal cost as well as the average marginal cost of the market. 
 
𝑞𝑖
∗ =
𝑎
𝑏
−
𝑎−𝑚𝑐     
𝑏
(
𝑁
𝑁+1
) −
𝑚𝑐 𝑖
𝑏
                (3) 
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Using the variables computed above I calculate among other things firm market share and market 
HHI where 𝐻𝐻𝐼 =   
𝑞𝑖
∗
𝑄∗
 
2
𝑛
𝑖=1 and ranges from 0.0-1.0.  The parameter effects can then be 
determined via repeated experiments to test the previously stated hypotheses.  
Important underlying assumptions of the Cournot solution are that firms have perfect 
information about all other firms in a market and that they choose their output simultaneously 
based on that perfect information to maximize individual profit.  So the firms are not interacting 
in a localized neighborhood based on limited information as is the case with many ABS models.  
Neighborhood interaction in an ABS context is however a logical extension. 
 
3.2 The ABS Element of the Model   
 
Here I am beginning at the Cournot equilibrium resulting from the analytic model described 
above and generating a dynamic process from that equilibrium solution via parameter changes to 
the model.  While the firms are not interacting with one another other than trivially in solving the 
Cournot equilibrium, collectively, the firms are interacting with the environment.  This 
interaction is what gives rise to the dynamics of this particular model.  While there are typically 
far too many elements in oligopoly markets to be collected in one analytic model, the ABS 
approach is distinct as a modeling framework from analytic approaches in that it is modular by 
nature and quite easily accommodates a great deal of complexity that results from adding 
parameters and components to the model.  The method of sensitivity analysis presented in 
section 4 is a robust tool for the analysis of such complex ABS models and allows a means of 
isolating the effects of each parameter. 
 
Model Parameters – initial settings 
Description Symbol Lower bound Upper bound 
Demand intercept a 20 20 
Demand slope b -1 -1 
Number of firms N 10 10 
Marginal cost mc 2 14 
Barriers to entry - 1 7 
Returns to innovation - .001 .01 
Cost of innovation - 5 75 
Propensity to innovate - 1% 68% 
experience experience 0 0 
Table 0: Ranges for parameters in the model. 
 
 
The model was implemented in a two dimensional space in Netlogo.  While necessity of such 
spatial aspects of the model in its present form are at present limited, future modifications, as 
discussed throughout the paper, would certainly benefit from this two dimensional environment.  
In building the model I began by creating an innovation region in the center of the world, the size 
of which can be adjusted within the world dimension of 17x17.  As the size of the innovation 
region relative to the world increases all firms have a greater likelihood of being able to 
innovate.  The region is represented as a square but since the world wraps around from one edge 
to the other it might be best to think of it as something resembling a continent on a globe.  
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Propensity to innovate in the table ranges from a 2x2 to a 14x14 region of innovation.  The ratio 
of the area of the innovation region to the area of the world are the percentages listed in table 0. 
Next, I created the firms.  In all of my simulations I begin with 10 firms randomly placed in 
the world.  A value for average market marginal cost is assigned between 2 and 14 as well as a 
standard deviation for those costs (the source of agent heterogeneity in this model) randomly 
assigned from 0 to 1.  These parameter settings are appropriate for the initial demand equation 
slope and intercept settings.  In general, when marginal costs are high supply intersects the 
elastic end of the demand equation and when marginal costs are low supply intersects the 
inelastic end of the demand equation.  Demand can be stationary, increasing, or decreasing.  
Growth in the intercept parameter at each iteration is set between -.005 and +.005.  Changing 
demand slope is not explored in this paper.   
Firms move one-step, in a 360 degree random direction at each iteration.  By making firm 
movement completely random I assume away the possibility that firms who innovate will be 
more likely to innovate in the future.  A logical extension would be to increase the future 
likelihood of innovation for firms that innovate.  After each iteration, firms collectively produce 
output based on the n-firm heterogeneous agent Cournot solution derived from the reaction 
function produced from equation (1).  If a firm is located on the innovation region and its 
cumulated profits are sufficiently positive
1
 to cover innovation costs then the firm will innovate.  
Innovation costs vary from 5 to 75.  Although innovation success is predetermined a useful 
extension would be to assign a probability of innovation success and a distribution of innovation 
costs.  Results of innovations are determined to be a marginal cost reduction between .001 and 
.01 of current marginal cost at any given iteration.  Returns could be normally distributed as well 
so while some firms will gain from innovation others would gain more and still others could lose 
their innovation investment.  Finally, firms gain a point of experience for each innovation 
attempt which improves the effectiveness of future innovations.
2   
When a firm’s cumulative profit falls below zero it exits the market.  Similarly, when the 
average profit of the market in a given iteration reaches a threshold then a new firm will enter the 
market in a random position on the world map.  The threshold is determined by the barriers to 
entry for the market.  At a low setting firms enter often while at a high setting firms enter the 
market less readily.  The model assumes the new entrant will have a marginal cost equal to the 
market average though it would be possible to assign a distribution of possible initial marginal 
costs for new entrants.
3
 
Some final simplifying assumptions of the model include the fact that market products are 
homogeneous in this model.  In reality firms have some degree of product differentiation.  I am 
not aware of a paper that models a n-firm Cournot game with differentiated products or even if a 
solution is computable in such a case.  As mentioned above, previous researchers have modeled 
product differentiation in this setting using a purely multi agent system [3].  Additionally, in 
reality firms often merge into one larger firm.  This model does not allow mergers.  Each firm is 
an independent entity.  Although, this feature could be added with reasonable ease and would be 
                                                 
1
 Since there is a cost to innovation firms cumulative profits must be sufficiently positive to cover the costs of 
innovation.  Firms cannot borrow in this model. 
2
 The change in marginal cost from innovation is defined by the following formula: 
𝑚𝑐𝑡+1 = 𝑚𝑐𝑡  −  (1 +  𝑙𝑛 (1 +  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ^ 2))  ∗  (𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠)  ∗  𝑚𝑐𝑡) 
  where mc is marginal cost, experience refers to the number of times the firm has innovated in the past, the 
exponent on experience is simply a scalar for innovation effectiveness set at 2.0.  
3
 There may be a more theoretically accurate way to model such barriers allowing technology hoarding and a 
diffusion process for example. 
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an interesting extension to the model.  I have also considered creating vertical firms in the same 
environment, in which case vertical mergers could occur. 
 
 
4 Sensitivity Analysis of the Parameters 
 
In a simulation all parameters are varied randomly except one which is varied systematically.  
The systematically varied parameter is adjusted incrementally so that samples for a number of 
settings are generated.  At each setting of the systematically varied parameter 200 experiments 
are conducted with each experiment consisting of 300 iterations; the mean HHI is computed and 
collected.  For each simulation the mean HHI’s are regressed against the systematically varied 
parameter.   
I present the simulation results as Brenner does by progressing through each parameter 
discussing its relevance to economic theory and impact on market concentration as measured by 
the mean HHI.  Regression analysis is used to estimate the effect of the systematically varied 
parameter on the mean HHI from each experiment in the simulations.  I also report the 
magnitude of the parameter (its total impact over the range of parameter settings) given random 
variation in the other parameters.  This provides a measure of leverage for the parameter not 
obtainable from the coefficient estimate alone.  From a policy perspective high leverage 
parameters are preferred to low leverage parameters as affecting them will yield greater change 
on the output variable of interest within the system.  Finally, I perform a Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg (BP/CW) test for heteroscedasticity, examine the variance of the mean HHI’s at each 
setting, and discuss the pattern of heteroscedasticity or lack thereof as evidenced by a visual 
inspection of residual plots.  Though indicative of heteroscedasticity in an econometric context, 
the results are useful from a policy perspective as a measure of parameter uncertainty in the 
model.  That said the regression results reported adjust for heteroscedasticity and include 
standard errors with a bias correction of the form 
𝑛
𝑛−𝑘
.   
 
4.1 Mainstream Market Theory Parameters 
 
4.1.1 High Cost vs. Low Cost  
 
For aviation or automobile manufacturing the start up and operating costs tend to be very high.  
These markets typically consist of a small number of large firms. Cost reducing innovations in 
this setting can provide a large effect when distributed on a large scale.  Low cost industries tend 
to have many smaller firms and such innovations do not have as dramatic an effect on costs.
4
  
The simulation produces results consistent with these theories and in general producers with 
higher initial costs tend to generate more concentrated markets than do low cost producers.   
 Regression results suggest that initial marginal cost has a positive effect on mean HHI.  The 
results are statistically significant and the total variation in HHI across the parameter space is 
0.18 suggesting from a policy perspective that this is a parameter of moderate leverage.  The 
                                                 
4
 Mathematically this effect is achieved in the model by defining marginal cost reductions as a % (between .001 and 
.01) of the current level.  So, higher cost industries experience greater dollar reductions in this framework.  In terms 
of footnote 3 it can be show that the formula reduces to the linear difference equation:  
𝑚𝑐𝑡+1 = 𝑚𝑐𝑡  –  𝜌 ∗  𝑚𝑐𝑡 , where 0 < 𝜌 < .1, creating a balancing feedback loop.  This follows from the parameter 
constraints: 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 < 300 and 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 < .01.  
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BP/CW p-value = .0000, which suggests heteroscedasticity.  A visual inspection of residual 
plots, suggests a functional form for the error term that is increasing in the independent variable 
suggesting an increasing uncertainty in the HHI outcomes at higher initial marginal costs.  
 
 
Figure 1: plot of HHI and Initial mc with regression line. 
 
 
Table 1: Regression results of HHI on initial mc. 
 Number of obs = 1252 
F(  1, 1250 ) = 175.64 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-Squared = .1257 
Root MSE = .13885 
HHI Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Initial mc .0130067 .0009814 13.25 0.000 .0110813 .0149321 
constant .070787 .0057297 12.35 0.000 .059546 .0820279 
 
4.1.2 Demand growth 
 
As demand grows within a market, profitability increases, more firms enter the market, and 
market concentration falls over time.  Similarly, as demand decreases profitability falls, firms 
exit the market, market shares increase, and market concentration increases.  The simulation 
produces results consistent with theory.   
 Regression results suggest that demand growth has a negative effect on market concentration.  
The results are statistically significant and the total variation in HHI across the parameter space 
is 0.26, suggesting demand growth is a parameter of high leverage from a policy perspective.  
The BP/CW p-value = .0000, which suggests heteroscedasticity.  An inspection of the residual 
plots suggests a functional form for the error term that is decreasing in the independent variable 
suggesting decreasing uncertainty in the HHI outcomes as demand increases.
5
    
                                                 
5
 An interesting extension would be to change the slope (elasticity) of demand over time combined with falling 
demand or growing demand.   Another extension would be to simulate different levels of demand volatility, as 
discussed in the literature review [15] T. S. Genc, et al., "Dynamic Oligopolistic Games under Uncertainty: A 
Stochastic Programming Approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 31, pp. 55-80, 01 2007., 
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Figure 2: plot of HHI and demand growth with regression line. 
 
 
Table 2: Regression results of HHI on demand growth. 
 Number of obs = 911 
F(  1, 909 ) = 465.95 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-Squared = 0.4055 
Root MSE = .10827 
HHI Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Demand 
Growth 
-25.82638 1.19645 -21.59 0.000 -28.1745 -23.47825 
constant .1721315 .0039804 43.25 0.000 .1643198 .1799433 
 
4.1.3 Barriers to Entry 
 
Markets with high barriers to entry tend to be highly concentrated.  It is not easy for other firms 
to enter the market even if it is a very profitable one to enter.  Oligopoly firms erect barriers; they 
purchase patents so that other firms cannot license a particular technology; they construct legal 
obstacles for new entrants, and lobby for protection from government, just to name a few.  That 
said if a market is sufficiently profitable then firms will find ways to enter.  Barriers to entry 
secure market power for those already in the market.  As barriers fall via deregulation or other 
means, firms enter the market more readily and market concentration on average falls.  The 
simulation produces results that are consistent with theory.   
With no barriers to entry, firms rapidly enter the market driving market concentration to very 
low levels characteristic of perfect competition.  In general, as the barriers to entry increase from 
1 to 7 the HHI tends to increase as well.  Regression results suggest barriers to entry have a 
positive effect on mean HHI.  The results are statistically significant and the total variation in 
HHI across the parameter space is 0.09 suggesting the parameter is one of low leverage.  The 
BP/CW p-value = .0002, which suggests heterogeneity.  A visual inspection of residual plots 
suggests no functional form for the error term as a function of the independent variable.  It is 
                                                                                                                                                             
combining various patterns of demand expansions and contractions over time as is the case with seasonal demand 
changes.  
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interesting to note that, relative to previous parameters, variance in mean HHI is quite large 
across many values in the parameter space.  
 
 
Figure 3: plot of HHI and barrier to entry with regression line. 
 
 
Table 3: Regression results of HHI on barrier to entry. 
 Number of obs = 1275 
F(  1, 1273 ) = 52.11 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-Squared = 0.0366 
Root MSE = .12691 
HHI Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Barrier to 
Entry 
.0123558 .0017116 7.22 0.000 .0089979 .0157136 
Constant .1158721 .0072271 16.03 0.000 .1016937 .1300505 
 
4.2 Innovation Specific Parameters  
 
4.2.1 Costs of Innovation 
 
From a Schumpeterian perspective it is the larger firms of concentrated markets that are the 
driving force of innovation.  Other theories state that market concentration and innovation are 
endogenously determined by other factors.  Nelson and Winter [18] suggests that increased rates 
of innovation would lead to concentrated markets in an evolutionary setting, essentially restating 
the Schumpeterian hypothesis from the other causal direction.  Within the model developed here 
the higher the cost of innovation the slower firms are to innovate as they will have to accumulate 
more profit to make such an investment in innovation.  The above theory [18] would suggest that 
decreased rates of innovation (from cost increases) should produce less concentrated markets.  
That said another study [19] finds that higher innovation costs lead to more concentrated 
markets, at least within the pharmaceutical industry. 
 Regression results suggest that cost of innovation has a negative effect on mean HHI which 
supports the claims of Nelson and Winter [18].  The results are statistically significant yet the 
total variation in HHI across the parameter space is only 0.07 suggesting this is a parameter of 
low leverage from a policy perspective.  The BP/CW p-value = .0000, which does suggests 
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heterogeneity.  As above, a visual inspection of residual plots suggests no functional form for the 
error term relative to the independent variable.  Variance in mean HHI is again quite large 
producing anywhere from close to monopoly to perfect competition outcomes across the entire 
parameter space. 
 
 
Figure 4: plot of HHI and cost of innovation with regression line. 
 
 
Table 4: Regression results of HHI on cost of innovation. 
 Number of obs = 2698 
F(  1, 2696 ) = 46.85 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-Squared = 0.0186 
Root MSE = .13523 
HHI Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Cost of 
Innovation 
-.0008623 .000126 -6.85 0.000 -.0011094 -.0006153 
constant .2042419 .0062602 32.63 0.000 .1919666 .2165171 
 
4.2.2 Returns to Innovation 
 
In the context of the theories provided above increasing the return to innovation implies 
increasing the rate of innovation, which should result in increased market concentration.  
Additionally, when firms gain greater returns from innovations they gain a cost advantage over 
competitors.  This increases their market share and profitability providing increased potential for 
survival in a market as price falls, in essence a first-mover advantage.  The result is a more 
concentrated market.  The simulation is consistent with these theories in that the coefficient 
estimate has the correct sign suggesting returns to innovation have a positive effect on mean HHI 
though this estimate is not statistically significant and total variation across the parameter space 
of 0.02 would suggest this to be a parameter of very low leverage.  The BP/CW p-value = .1754, 
which does not suggests heterogeneity.  Again, variance in mean HHI is quite large producing 
anywhere from close to monopoly to perfect competition outcomes across the entire parameter 
space. 
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Figure 5: plot of HHI and returns to innovation with regression line. 
 
 
Table 5: Regression results of HHI on returns to innovation. 
 Number of obs = 1628 
F(  1,1626 ) = 1.47 
Prob > F = .2253 
R-Squared = .0009 
Root MSE = .14055 
HHI Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Returns to 
Innovation 
1.670415 1.376929 1.21 0.225 -1.030327 4.371156 
constant .1626876 .0076005 21.40 0.000 .1525309 .1775954 
 
4.2.3 Propensity to Innovate 
 
According to Nelson and Winter [18] more innovation should produce more concentrated 
markets.  If firms in a market are more prone to innovation due to a greater access to key 
resources, human capital, or spillovers from neighboring firms, costs should decrease rapidly 
placing pressure on non-innovators to exit the market.  This would produce a more concentrated 
market.  Simulation results are consistent with this theory; the regression analysis suggests a 
positive relationship between propensity to innovate and mean HHI and the results are 
statistically significant.  The total variation in HHI across the parameter space is 0.04 suggesting 
this is a parameter of low leverage.  The BP/CW p-value = .0078, which suggests heterogeneity 
though a visual inspection of the residual plots suggests no specific functional form relative to 
the independent variable.  Variance in mean HHI is quite large producing anywhere from 
monopoly to perfect competition outcomes across the entire parameter space. 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009
H
H
I
Returns to Innovation
Mean HHI vs. Returns to Innovation
mean HHI
   
p.14 
 
Figure 6: plot of HHI and propensity to innovate with regression line. 
 
 
Table 6: Regression results of HHI on propensity to innovate. 
 Number of obs = 1283 
F(  1, 1281 ) = 5.78 
Prob > F = 0.0164 
R-Squared = .0042 
Root MSE = .13391 
HHI Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
Propensity to 
Innovate 
.0021744 .0009047 2.40 0.016 -.0003995 .0039493 
constant .1462436 .0077849 18.79 0.000 .130971 .1615161 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The model presented in this paper demonstrates that analytic and agent based models can be 
implemented together in a simulation setting.  Furthermore, it clarifies, and demonstrates the 
robustness of, the unique sensitivity analysis method developed by Brenner [1].  A method which 
isolates the effects of individual parameters in a heterogeneous agent based context.  Finally, the 
model itself provides results that are consistent with economic theory.  In terms of what 
mainstream market theory would predict: 
 
 Markets with high costs of production tend to be more concentrated than markets with low 
costs of production.   
 As demand expands all firms become more profitable and more firms enter the market which 
decreases market concentration. 
 As barriers to entry increase the number of firms entering a market decreases and the market 
becomes more concentrated. 
 
For the parameters specific to the innovation aspect of the model the results were consistent with 
theories of Nelson and Winter [18] and although the causal direction is reversed Schumpeterian 
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theory as well, in that the results show positive correlation (regardless of causal direction) 
between innovation and market concentration.  These results suggest:  
 
 Higher costs for innovation (slow innovation) and tend to create a less concentrated market. 
 Higher propensity toward innovation creates a more concentrated market. 
 
 The effect of the last remaining parameter was inconclusive from the sensitivity analysis and 
within the framework of the model appears to have no significant affect on market concentration 
outcomes.  That said they may be important determinants for one or more of the model’s firm 
and market output variables. 
  
 Changing the cost reductions experienced from innovations for all firms in a market. 
 
The literature on oligopoly theory discusses all of the components explored in the ABS model 
developed in this paper, as evidenced in the literature review section.  An important future 
development for the model would be to include a learning component for firms.  In present form 
the model consists of firms innovating at random.  As stated by Price [7], the benefit of ABS 
models is that they allow behavioral aspects to be injected into the model.  While many analytic 
models contain no behavioral elements the model presented here would benefit by the inclusion 
of credible strategies and behaviors for firms pursuing cost reducing innovations.  Additionally, 
it would be useful to expand the behavioral realism of the model by employing the additions 
discussed throughout the paper.   
The great advantage of the ABS approach is that each of these features can be thought of as an 
independent component and collected together to make a very complex model with many 
features and possibilities for expansion.  The ABS framework does not rely on the closed form 
solutions that analytic models require.  Given the growth in complexity that occurs as these 
dynamic models are generalized, analytic models tend to be very simple and constrained to 
focusing on only one particular issue.  Though adding components increases model complexity 
the sensitivity analysis implemented is robust with the only constraint being computational 
resources which with models including many parameters can be an issue. 
Finally, although I do not currently have an appropriate data set, a future goal would be to see 
if market data could be used to validate the model.  With an understanding of the parameter 
space provided by the sensitivity analysis realistic setting for the parameters could be obtained to 
generate patterns consistent with real world market performance as previous studies have done 
based on data  in the computer market [2] and energy markets [20], [21], [22].  Parameters of 
high leverage could then be identified as targets for effective policy.    
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